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Cost Strategies for Litigants:
The Significance of R. v. Caron
Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., and Alison Latimer*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no want of important and interesting public law cases to be
litigated in our courts. There is of course a big problem in how these cases
are to be financed. It is a rare client with a Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 issue who has deep pockets, and deep pockets are required for
almost any Charter challenge. It is therefore a constant struggle to find
ways in which to move the litigation forward. With cases that do not
require more than a day or two of court time and a few days of preparation,
there is always the possibility that a lawyer will take on the case pro bono,
with at least some prospect of being able to collect and keep an award of
costs made after the case is over. While not common, it is still possible for
an unsuccessful public interest litigant to obtain a cost award after the case
is over2 and for successful public interest litigants there is the prospect of
obtaining full or near full indemnity for costs.3
*
Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., is the managing partner of Arvay Finlay, Barristers, Vancouver,
B.C. Alison Latimer is an associate at Arvay Finlay.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
2
See, e.g., B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24,
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.), where the unsuccessful applicants were awarded costs pursuant to
r. 57.01(2) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, O. Reg. 560/84 that expressly authorized such an
award; see also Barclay (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2194, 2006
BCCA 434 (B.C.C.A.).
3
This is an issue that has recently been addressed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal: Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 2009 BCCA 563 (B.C.C.A.); Vancouver
(City) v. Zhang, [2011] B.C.J. No. 469, 2011 BCCA 138 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Zhang”]. Very
recently, in Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44,
2011 SCC 44, at paras. 158-159 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada upheld an order of full
indemnity costs that was awarded at trial following the principles articulated in Adams. See also
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Algonquin Wildlands League v. Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources), [1998]
O.J. No. 4331, 117 O.A.C. 174 (Ont. C.A.); Assn. of Professional Engineers of Ontario v. Ontario
(Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing), [2007] O.J. No. 3440, 229 O.A.C. 245 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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There are, of course, limits to how many or what kind of cases counsel can take on pro bono speculating that his or her services will be
compensated in an award of costs. For even the “average” Charter
challenge, hundreds of hours or more will be involved. For most Canadians this is simply out of their reach and for most lawyers beyond their
willingness or ability to be philanthropic. It is for these types of cases
that the law of advance (or interim) costs is needed. In the last few years,
we have seen the pendulum swing in this area of the law. Prior to 2003,
the very concept of advance costs in public interest litigation was, for
most lawyers and judges, not only unheard of, but absurd. Absurd to
suggest that a court could make the opposing side to a lawsuit finance the
other side; outrageous, even, to suggest that this be done in advance of
the litigation proceeding irrespective of the outcome and with every
possibility that the case would fail. But then came Okanagan4 which not
only granted advance costs in Aboriginal litigation at the behest of a very
poor First Nation thrust into litigation with the Crown — a very significant development — but in which the Supreme Court of Canada went on
to hold that such advance costs orders could be granted in any public
interest litigation if certain, albeit strict, conditions were met. For public
law lawyers it was a momentous day, but from the moment the decision
was rendered I worried about its longevity and how its longevity might
turn on how this newfound and powerful weapon (and make no mistake,
that is what it was) was going to be deployed by the ground troops in the
trenches of constitutional litigation.
Victory was short-lived. Although I declined to take on many advance costs applications after Okanagan because I did not think any of
them were the “right case”, I did decide to bring an advance costs
application when my long-time client, the Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium, was once again harassed by Canada Customs notwithstanding that we had barely left the Supreme Court of Canada after an arduous, 10-year odyssey to that Court.5 This felt like the right case to test the
limits of Okanagan. My clients were not desperately poor, indeed were
comfortably middle class; they operated the store through a small
company but there was no way they could afford to take on Customs
4
British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76,
2003 SCC 71, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Okanagan”]. Joseph J. Arvay was counsel for the
intervener Chief Roger Williams in that case.
5
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, 2007 SCC 2, at para. 5 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters #2”].
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again, and it seemed very wrong to me that they would have to finance
another challenge to the Customs practices that they thought they had
more or less already demonstrated were unconstitutional. Surely, I thought,
if Customs wanted to have another court battle, it should be required to
finance it and not my clients. I met with success at the British Columbia
Supreme Court6 and then lost in the B.C. Court of Appeal.7 I could have
stopped there, and in retrospect maybe I should have, but I thought (and
my clients agreed) that if the Supreme Court of Canada was truly committed to the principle of access to justice for ordinary Canadians, then this
was the case to find out. We lost badly. I felt quite responsible for the
decision that seemed to be the death knell for advance costs awards.8
Then word came down that the Supreme Court of Canada would be
hearing another advance costs case in the matter of Caron.9 We were
retained by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association to intervene in that
case and I hoped to find a way to redeem, to some extent, the havoc I
seemed to have played on the law of advance costs in Little Sisters #2. I
called my former student and now friend Professor Benjamin L. Berger,
then of the Faculty of Law of the University of Victoria, to see if he was
interested in co-counselling me on the file and he enthusiastically agreed.
He warned me that he had never been in any court before and would be
happy to help write the factum and be delighted to appear as co-counsel
with me in the Supreme Court of Canada, but that I would be the one to
be “throwing the snowballs”. A day before the case was to be argued in
the Supreme Court of Canada, I called Ben to tell him I had come down
with a nasty flu and was not feeling well enough to travel, so he was
6
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), [2005] B.C.J. No. 885, 2005 BCSC 606 (B.C.S.C.).
7
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), [2005] B.C.J. No. 291, 2005 BCCA 94 (B.C.C.A.). Our fate may well have been sealed,
perhaps long before we got to the Supreme Court of Canada, by the fact that in the Tsilhqot’in
Nation land title case, plaintiff’s counsel had received an advance costs award in Tsilhqot’in Nation v.
British Columbia, [2004] B.C.J. No. 937, 2004 BCSC 610 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in (2004)”],
and had been paid some $10 million as “costs” as of 2006, and the trial was not yet over. The quantum
of costs incurred not only attracted adverse judicial commentary in the B.C. Court of Appeal in
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2, 2006 BCCA 2, at paras. 18, 73, 89, 112,
122-124 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in (2006)”], but was also very much brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court of Canada hearing Little Sisters #2. While $10 million is a lot of
money, what few people have asked is how much the lawyers for the governments had spent,
especially since they were outside counsel and thus likewise in receipt of public funding and “in
advance and irrespective of the outcome”.
8
Little Sisters #2, supra, note 5.
9
R. v. Caron, [2011] S.C.J. No. 5, 2011 SCC 5 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Caron”].
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going to have to make his first-ever court appearance, do it in the
Supreme Court of Canada and do it solo. I watched him from home via
webcast and, in my humble opinion, he was dazzling.
That personal note aside, Caron is not a very interesting decision on
the issue of advance costs (nor perhaps is my personal note). The best
that can be said about Caron is that the Court may not have displayed
quite the same hostility toward advance costs awards as it did in Little
Sisters #2. As will be seen, we see a relaxation of certain elements of two
prongs of the three-prong test10 for advance costs: in particular, what
makes a case of “public importance” and when the “impecuniosity”
requirement is met. But the Court still requires that such awards only be
granted in exceptional cases. In its deference to the rulings of the lower
courts, it may have sent a signal that the question of advance costs is a
matter for the trial courts and perhaps courts of appeal which “have
primary responsibility for the administration of justice in the province”.11
We suspect, therefore, that it will be a long time before there is another
advance costs case in the Supreme Court of Canada. It also means that
counsel likely only have one shot for an order of advance costs and that
will be in the court of first instance. It might also possibly mean that
instead of “Rowbotham” orders,12 “Caron” orders will be made in
certain, albeit a very narrow category of, criminal cases. Where the case
might have more important implications is with respect to the Court’s
ruling on the inherent power of the superior court to come to the aid of
an inferior tribunal. Given that the Court recognized an express power of
the superior court to come to the aid of an inferior court (and likely as
well an administrative tribunal) whenever it is “essential to avoid an
injustice”, this is a power that may now only be limited by the imagination of inventive lawyers and explicit statutory provisions to the contrary.
10

Being (1) prima facie merit, (2) public importance and (3) impecuniosity.
Id., at para. 5.
12
In R. v. Rowbotham, [1988] O.J. No. 271, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Rowbotham”], the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the denial of state-funded counsel to an
indigent, unrepresented accused facing serious and complex criminal charges violates the right to a
fair trial guaranteed by the Charter. The Court determined that the appropriate remedy under s. 24(1)
of the Charter was a conditional stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded
counsel by the Attorney General or legal aid program. Now accused individuals can bring a
Rowbotham application wherein the accused must show on a balance of probabilities that he or she
has been denied legal aid and has exhausted the legal aid appeal process, that he or she is indigent,
that the trial involves serious and complex issues and that the applicant will be denied a fair trial
absent the assistance of legal counsel. If the accused individual is successful, the court orders a stay
of proceedings unless and until the Attorney General or legal aid provides funding for counsel.
11
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Justice Abella’s concurring opinion also raises an interesting question as
to whether statutory courts or tribunals will have the jurisdiction to order
advance costs themselves and without the aid of the superior courts and
indeed to grant other orders that up until now were considered the sole
reserve of courts with inherent jurisdiction.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERIM COSTS IN CANADA
Okanagan was the first of three cases rendered by the Supreme Court
of Canada dealing with advance costs in the context of public interest
litigation. Okanagan was a civil case that was initially heard in the
superior court of British Columbia. Members of four Bands began
logging on Crown land in B.C. without authorization under the Forest
Practices Code of British Columbia Act.13 The Minister of Forests served
the Bands with stop-work orders under the Code, and commenced
proceedings to enforce the orders. The Bands claimed that they had
Aboriginal title to the lands in question and were entitled to log them.
They filed a notice of constitutional question challenging the Code as
conflicting with their constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada noted that the discretionary power to
award interim costs had already been recognized in Canada and was
more typically exercised in matrimonial, trust, bankruptcy and corporate
cases. Nevertheless, the Court held that interim costs were available in
cases of public importance to ensure “that ordinary citizens will have
access to the courts to determine their constitutional rights and other
issues of broad social significance”.14
The Court upheld an award of interim costs made by the B.C. Court
of Appeal in Okanagan and in so doing, the Court set out the criteria
governing the discretionary award in the context of litigation of public
importance:
1. The party seeking interim costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for
the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues
to trial — in short, the litigation would be unable to proceed if the order
were not made.

13
14

R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 159.
Okanagan, supra, note 4, at paras. 32-35, 38.
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2. The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious; that is, the
claim is at least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the interests of
justice for the opportunity to pursue the case to be forfeited just
because the litigant lacks financial means.
3. The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular
litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in
previous cases.15

The Court noted that while each of these are “necessary conditions
that must be met for an award of interim costs to be available”, the fact
that they are met in a given case is not necessarily sufficient to justify
such an award.16 The case must also be “rare and exceptional” in order to
attract interim costs.17
Okanagan-style interim costs were ordered in four superior court
cases in the four years leading to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Little Sisters #2. Three of these cases dealt with issues of Aboriginal rights or title.18 The fourth was Little Sisters #2.
When Little Sisters #2 came before the Supreme Court of Canada,
the Court was faced once again with a civil case arising out of proceedings in the superior court of British Columbia. The applicants in Little
Sisters #2 were a small corporation appealing a detention order made
against four books by the Commissioner of Customs and Revenue. The
applicants were successful in the superior court, but lost in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal and again in the Supreme Court of Canada. In
rejecting Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium’s request for interim
costs, the majority made the stringent Okanagan analysis even more
restrictive. The majority placed much emphasis on the “rare and exceptional” quality that any case warranting such an order must have. Perhaps
the most stark illustration of why Little Sisters #2 was such a defeat for
constitutional litigators is the contrast between judgments of the dissent
and the majority rendered in that case on this last factor. Specifically, the
dissent was prepared to afford much greater deference to the judge at
15

Id., at para. 40.
Id., at para. 41.
17
Id., at paras. 1, 31, 32.
18
R. v. Fournier, [2004] O.J. No. 1136, [2004] O.T.C. 260 (Ont. S.C.J.), revd [2006] O.J.
No. 2434, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 58 (Ont. C.A.); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002]
B.C.J. No. 1652, 2002 BCCA 434 (B.C.C.A.); reconsidered Tsilhqot’in (2004), supra, note 7;
reconsidered Tsilhqot’in (2006), supra, note 7; Keewatin v. Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources),
[2006] O.J. No. 3418, 32 C.P.C. (6th) 258 (Ont. S.C.J.).
16
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first instance on the question of whether a case was “special enough” to
warrant an award of advance costs. The dissent would have upheld the
chambers judge’s award of advance costs, at least in part, noting that
“[w]hether a case, though special, is not ‘special enough’ or fails to ‘rise
to the level’ of compelling public importance is a subjective test whose
outcome will inevitably depend to a significant extent on the eye of the
beholder.”19 In contrast, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. for the majority gave a
singularity to the ratio of Okanagan putting advance costs awards
practically out of reach of any future litigation when they noted: “The
rule in Okanagan arose on a very specific and compelling set of facts
that created a situation that should hardly ever reoccur.”20
Okanagan-style interim costs were awarded in only five cases (including Caron) in the four years leading to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Caron. Two of the five cases were superior court
cases dealing with Aboriginal rights.21 One of the cases was actually two
superior court actions that were being tried together. The first was a
derivative action brought by Deloitte & Touche Inc. in its capacity as
Trustee of the Estate of Bre-X Minerals Ltd., a Bankrupt; the second
action was a class proceeding commenced by investors who lost money
on the collapse of Bre-X Minerals Ltd. Interim costs were ordered
against Deloitte & Touche, the Trustee, and that decision has been
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.22 A fourth case was a proposed
class action for a number of classes or persons who claimed to be
affected by invalid Temporary Guardianship Orders issued by the
Director of Child and Family Services. Interim costs were ordered in
favour of one of the children, whose case arose when she was a temporary ward of the state.23 The fifth case was Caron.

19

Little Sisters #2, supra, note 5, at para. 154.
Id., at para. 78.
Hagwilget Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2008] F.C.J. No. 723, 2008 FC 574 (F.C.); Québec (Procureure générale) c. Corneau,
[2010] J.Q. no 1019, 2010 QCCS 463 (Que. S.C.).
22
Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., [2010] O.J. No. 5498, 2010 ONSC 6921 (Ont. S.C.J.)
(leave to appeal granted January 25, 2011).
23
C. (L.) v. Alberta (Metis Settlements Child & Family Services, Region 10), [2011] A.J.
No. 84, 2011 ABQB 42 (Alta. Q.B.).
20
21
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III. CONTEXT OF CARON
As with any case, it is important to have regard to the particular context in which Caron arose. Specifically, Mr. Caron was subject to a very
common quasi-criminal regulatory charge of failing to make a left turn
safely. If convicted, he faced a fine of $100. He admitted the underlying
offence, but claimed that the proceedings were a nullity because the court
documents were not provided to him in French. He claimed he had the
right to use French in proceedings before the courts of Alberta. His
position was that this right could not be abrogated and that the Alberta
Languages Act24 was therefore unconstitutional.
Mr. Caron’s lawyer estimated that the matter would take two to five
days. Mr. Caron exhausted his personal resources, including borrowed
money. He also sought funding from the Alberta francophone association. The association refused to fund his case; however, he obtained two
loans of $15,000 each from its supporters. Mr. Caron sought additional
donations and also received $70,000 from the federal Court Challenges
Program. He also solicited support over the Internet. Legal aid was not
available.
The proceedings were before the Provincial Court of Alberta. After
approximately 18 months of on-again-off-again hearings, Mr. Caron ran
out of money. By this time, the Court Challenges program had been
abolished.
The Supreme Court of Canada described the situation as follows:
The provincial court was confronted with a potential failure of
justice once the unexpected length of the trial had exhausted
Mr. Caron’s financial resources. By that time, substantial trial time and
costs had already been expended, including the substantial public
monies provided under the Court Challenges Program. In mid-trial the
provincial court, so to speak, had a tiger by the tail. The Crown insisted
on pursuing the prosecution in provincial court; Mr. Caron insisted on
his French language defence. Neither side expressed any interest in a
stay of proceedings.
The courts in Alberta were clearly concerned lest the Crown
achieve, by pressing on with the prosecution in the provincial court, an
unfair advantage (“lop-sided”, Ritter J.A. called it) over the accused in
the creation of the crucial factual record on which an important
24

R.S.A. 2000, c. L-6.
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constitutional issue would be determined. A lopsided trial would not
have put the languages issue to rest. Mr. Caron’s challenge was
considered by the courts below to have merit and in their view it was in
the interest of all Albertans that the challenge be properly dealt with.25

Mr. Caron applied to the provincial court for interim costs. The provincial court was satisfied that he would be unable to complete the trial
unless he was provided with funding and made an order for same
pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter.26 The Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench set aside this order and held that the provincial court lacked
jurisdiction to make an order for interim costs;27 however, the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench also recognized that Mr. Caron could not
proceed without an award for interim costs and came to the assistance of
the lower court by making such an order.28 It was the validity of the latter
order from the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench that was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.

IV. CARON’S THREE “IMPLICATIONS”
1. Quasi-Criminal Cases
The Crown argued forcefully that the context of the Caron case —
the underlying quasi-criminal offence — disentitled Mr. Caron from an
award of interim costs. This argument proceeded on the basis that costs
regimes in the civil and criminal context are very different and costs
awards are not generally available at all, let alone in advance, in criminal
and quasi-criminal proceedings. The Crown argued that interim costs
were really a civil remedy.
In our preparation for the appeal, it was this aspect of the case that
concerned us the most. Costs were rarely ordered in criminal cases and
then only where there was misconduct or abuse.29 Nevertheless, we
25

Caron, supra, note 9, at paras. 21-22.
R. c. Caron, [2006] A.J. No. 1760, 2006 ABPC 278 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
27
R. v. Caron, [2007] A.J. No. 448, 2007 ABQB 262 (Alta. Q.B.).
28
R. v. Caron, [2007] A.J. No. 1162, 2007 ABQB 632 (Alta. Q.B.).
29
Caron, supra, note 9, at para. 49. A distinction has historically been drawn between
“costs” and “funding”. Costs are a matter of statutory and/or inherent jurisdiction for courts of first
instance. Funding, in contrast, requires a legislative appropriation. Funding and cost orders can be
made pursuant to s. 24 of the Charter. See, e.g., for funding New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.); for costs see R. v.
974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] S.C.J. No. 79, 2001 SCC 81 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “974649 Ontario
26
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argued that superior courts always had inherent jurisdiction to award
costs in a criminal case. We recognized that the rare instances where they
had done so in the past were in cases where there was Crown misconduct, but argued that those instances were simply an illustration of a
more general rule that a superior court could do so where there were
exceptional circumstances. We argued that the law of advance costs
where exceptional circumstances were required meshed rather nicely
with the law of costs in criminal proceedings, which also required
exceptional circumstances, and hence there was no doctrinal reason why
the superior court could not, in a regulatory or criminal proceeding, order
advance costs.
The Court in Caron spent little time discussing the role of costs in
criminal proceedings and in two paragraphs sent a pretty clear message
that its decision should be understood as more a branch of civil rather
than criminal litigation. The plurality said:
I should make it clear that the present decision does not constitute
a general invitation for applications to fund the defence of ordinary
criminal cases where constitutional (including Charter) issues happen
to be raised. In those cases the gravamen is truly the criminal offence.
Here the traffic court context is simply background to the constitutional
fight. A more appropriate analogy, as will be discussed, is the
Okanagan/Little Sisters (No. 2) paradigm for public interest funding in
a civil case.30

And in its conclusion it said this as well:
Although costs are not generally available in quasi-criminal
proceedings (absent special circumstances such as Crown misconduct
of which there is none here), this case is more in the nature of regular
constitutional litigation conducted (as discussed) by an impecunious
plaintiff for the benefit of the Franco-Albertan community generally. In
these unusual circumstances, Mr. Caron should have his costs on a
party and party basis in this Court.31

Inc.”]; but the more common example (and misconception) of a “funding” order is a Rowbotham
order, which actually only imposes a stay of the prosecution unless and until the Crown issues
funding to the defence in circumstances where without funding the trial would be unfair. See, e.g.,
R. v. Rowbotham, supra, note 12, at 46 C.C.C. It is interesting that the Court in Caron, supra, note 9,
now seems to use the terms “funding” and “costs” interchangeably: see, e.g., paras. 1, 6, 23, 38.
30
Caron, supra, note 9, at para. 23.
31
Id., at para. 49.
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The question remains whether, notwithstanding these cautions,
Caron will spawn applications for advance costs in situations where
Rowbotham orders would otherwise have to be brought? It is at least
possible that there might be such situations. We encountered one such
situation in a case that preceded our involvement in Caron. We had been
retained to defend Winston Blackmore, the “Bishop of Bountiful”, who
was charged with practising “polygamy” contrary to section 293(1)(a) of
the Criminal Code.32 The prosecution was ultimately stayed following a
judgment of the B.C. Supreme Court quashing the decision to charge
Mr. Blackmore as being unlawful for what we described as essentially
“special prosecutor shopping”.33 Prior to that decision, however, we were
preparing an application for an order that would have been a type of
hybrid between a Rowbotham order and an order of interim costs
pursuant to the principles articulated in Okanagan and Little Sisters #2.
Our thinking was that even if the Court would not order an absolute stay
of the prosecution because of our allegation of “special prosecutor
shopping”, the Court should at least conditionally stay the prosecution
until there was funding for such prosecution (à la Rowbotham, except
that the funding was a form of “remedy” for the abuse rather than a
prospective remedy to ensure a “fair trial”). Alternatively, we would have
argued directly for an order of advance costs on the basis of the analysis
in Okanagan/Little Sisters #2 because (somewhat like Caron) the case
was more “constitutional” than “criminal”, although it was clearly both.
We also believed that with an Okanagan analysis we might be entitled to
higher levels of funding if we were successful34 and that there should not
be the same rather onerous “impecuniosity” requirements as existed in
Rowbotham. We believed our case exceptional, in part, because
Mr. Blackmore was being prosecuted under a law that the Criminal
Justice Branch was presently on record as considering unconstitutional.
Our premise was that if the Crown wanted to run a “test case” to establish the constitutional validity of a law then the Attorney General should
pay for it without regard to whether Mr. Blackmore had the financial
means to pay. Again, the emphasis was more on the need for funding in a
criminal case because of its public importance than on the need for
funding to ensure a fair trial, but admittedly both interests were engaged.
32

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Blackmore v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2009] B.C.J. No. 1890, 2009 BCSC
1299 (B.C.S.C.).
34
We address “quantum” issues below.
33
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As noted above, that application was never brought because the prosecution was stayed, but it does at least provide another example of when an
advance costs application might be brought in the criminal context.35
Even if advance costs will not be used in purely criminal cases, perhaps because there is either legal aid or Rowbotham orders available,
because neither is the norm for regulatory cases, it is difficult to see how
the lid on Caron is going to be closed to other regulatory cases that
otherwise meet the requirement of Okanagan and Little Sisters #2. Given
the proliferation of regulatory offences, this type of offence is likely one
of the most common ways that a citizen will interact with the state, and
no doubt there will be other cases where issues of public importance are
raised in such proceedings and, thus, assuming the other criteria are met,
they could well attract advance costs awards.
2. Inherent Jurisdiction to Act in Aid
If Caron is important, it may be because of the robust interpretation
it gave to the inherent power of the superior court to come to the aid of
inferior courts or tribunals. In the past, this jurisdiction has been exercised only in certain categories of cases such as granting subpoenas,
granting bail or dealing with contempt, but the Supreme Court of Canada
has held that this “categories approach” is not appropriate. Instead, the
Court adopted the view expressed in I.H. Jacob’s seminal article “The
Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” that the inherent jurisdiction of the
court may be invoked “in an apparently inexhaustible variety of
circumstances”.36
While the Court held that this power should still be exercised “sparingly and with caution” and only where the inferior court or tribunal is
“powerless to act”, it otherwise allowed for considerable application of
35
We later brought a separate application for advance costs for Mr. Blackmore to participate in the polygamy Reference, which was more or less a pure Okanagan/Little Sisters #2 approach.
That application was dismissed in Reference re Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.), [2010] B.C.J.
No. 682, 2010 BCSC 517 (B.C.S.C.). The Court held that Mr. Blackmore did not have a direct
interest in the outcome of the Reference and therefore did not need to be a “party” to the Reference.
The Court found that costs are not generally awarded in a Reference and that, given the Court’s
finding on the issue of party standing, Mr. Blackmore’s participation was not necessary to move the
proceedings forward. The Court therefore dismissed the application.
36
Caron, supra, note 9, at para. 29, citing I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court” (1970) 23 Curr. Legal Probs. 23. See also, e.g., MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995]
S.C.J. No. 101, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cunningham, [2010] S.C.J. No. 10, 2010 SCC 10
(S.C.C.); R. v. Hinse, [1995] S.C.J. No. 97, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597 (S.C.C.).
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the doctrine since it would seem to apply whenever it was necessary to
“avoid an injustice”.37 The Court did not seem to even limit the superior
court’s power to act in aid of inferior courts, leaving open the possibility
of superior courts acting in aid of administrative tribunals as well. One
expects to find now a “variety of circumstances”, whether involving
provincial courts (child protection proceedings come to mind) or administrative tribunals (the list is “inexhaustible”), where inventive counsel
will be seeking the assistance of the superior courts. This, in other words,
might be why Caron, a case we describe as not very interesting or
important, turns out to be the “sleeper” of last year’s cases from the
Court.
There is one limit, however, on the inherent power of superior courts
to come to the assistance of an inferior tribunal, and that is if to do so
would be to contravene a statutory provision. However, no contravention
will be found simply because there are statutory provisions which cover
similar territory (such as the various statutes in Alberta dealing with
costs). The Court insisted that any contrary statutory provisions would
have to be express and not implied before its inherent jurisdiction to “do
what is essential ‘to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice
according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner’” could be
displaced.38
The issue of whether the Alberta Provincial Court had jurisdiction to
make an award of interim costs was not before the Supreme Court of
Canada and the Court expressly declined to comment on the correctness
of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench assessment that the provincial
court had no jurisdiction to make such an order.39
However, Abella J.’s concurring opinion certainly leaves open the
question whether inferior courts or tribunals might enjoy this power
without the assistance of the superior court. She held:
It is worth remembering, as Binnie J. acknowledged, that this
exercise of inherent jurisdiction was based on the premise that the
provincial court lacked the jurisdiction to make the order. Regrettably
that piece in the jurisdictional puzzle is not, strictly speaking, before us.
Mr. Caron had made an unsuccessful application for Okanagan funding
directly to the provincial court. The court concluded that while the
37
38
39

Caron, supra, note 9, at para. 30.
Id., at paras. 32, 34.
Id., at paras. 13, 19.
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Okanagan criteria were met, Okanagan costs could not be ordered by
the provincial court. That decision was essentially undisturbed by the
Court of Queen’s Bench (2007), 75 Alta. L.R. (4th) 287, per Marceau
J. and was not appealed by Mr. Caron. He chose instead to seek his
funding by way of a new claim to the Queen’s Bench, seeking the
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as a superior court to make the
order. As a result, the question of whether a statutory court or tribunal
has jurisdiction to order Okanagan costs will have to be determined in
a future case.
That leaves us in the problematic position of having to decide
Mr. Caron’s ability to obtain funding and continue with this litigation as
if no other jurisdictional course were available to him. I therefore simply
raise a cautionary note: this Court’s evolutionary acknowledgment of the
independence, integrity and expertise of statutory courts and tribunals
may well be inconsistent with an approach that has the effect of
expanding the reach of a superior court’s common law inherent
jurisdiction into matters of which a statutory court or tribunal is seized.
When considering the proper limits of a superior court’s inherent
jurisdiction, any such inquiry should reconcile the common law scope
of inherent jurisdiction with the implied legislative mandate of a
statutory court or tribunal, to control its own process to the extent
necessary to prevent an injustice and accomplish its statutory
objectives. (See Cunningham, at para. 19; ATCO, at para. 51; Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3
S.C.R. 480, at para. 37; R. v. Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128; and, Toronto
(City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at
para. 35.) The inability to order funding in the very limited
circumstances contemplated by Okanagan and Little Sisters could well
frustrate the ability of the provincial courts and tribunals to continue to
hear potentially meritorious cases of public importance. As McLachlin
C.J. observed in Dunedin, costs awards are significant remedial tools
and “integrally connected to the court’s control of its trial process”
(para. 81).40

In other words, Abella J. relied on the Court’s earlier jurisprudence
which emphasized that “the powers of a statutory court or tribunal extend
beyond the express language of its enabling legislation to the powers
necessary to perform its intended functions.”41 Given the facts of this
case, namely, that it was a practical impossibility for the trial to be
40
41

Id., at paras. 53-54 (emphasis added).
974649 Ontario Inc., supra, note 29, at para. 70.
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completed without an order of advance costs, Abella J. suggests, without
deciding, that the ability of the lower court to complete hearing a
potentially meritorious case of public importance is within their mandate
such that the power to order advance costs should be implied.
As noted above, it would seem that the power of the superior court to
come in aid extends not just to courts but to administrative tribunals, and
this would thus include orders for advance costs. Indeed, in light of
Abella J.’s concurring decision, it may be that such administrative
tribunals themselves hold such a power in circumstances where such a
power is necessary for them to perform their intended functions.
3. Clarification of the Analysis for Advance Costs
While Caron does not represent a significant development in the law
of advance costs, there are at least three aspects of the decision that do
suggest that an order of advance costs might be slightly easier to obtain
in the future than was heretofore the case.
(a) Public Importance
Often in the course of an interim costs application brought in the
context of a constitutional challenge to a law, the Attorney General will
argue that the case will only be of importance if the litigant is successful
because only then will the law be struck down. In such cases the Attorney General’s position is invariably that the litigation is not of sufficient
importance because if the litigant loses, the law will remain the same. Of
course, this style of analysis stems from Little Sisters #2, where the
majority held that “[r]ecognizing a case as special cannot be justified
solely by reference to one particular desired or apprehended outcome of
the litigation. It must be based on the nature of the litigation itself.”42 The
majority went on to find that the litigation in Little Sisters #2 would only
be of exceptional public importance if Canada Customs was shown to be
acting unconstitutionally, but not exceptional if Customs was proven to
have acted in accordance with its constitutional duties. The Court held
that it could not find a case to be of exceptional importance based on the

42

Little Sisters #2, supra, note 5, at para. 64.

442

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

possible future success of the case. To do so risked prejudging the merits
of the case.
However dubious we find that reasoning — after all, the court need
only find the case has prima facie merit to qualify for advance costs and
the fact is that a successful challenge is almost always of more significance than an unsuccessful one — Caron shifts this analysis ever so
slightly. In Caron, the Court characterized the importance of the case
both in terms of the impact it would have on Alberta legislation if
Mr. Caron were to succeed (which was described as “extremely serious”
and necessitating a quick resolution),43 and in terms of the “injury
created by continuing uncertainty” if the case was unable to proceed or
even if it proceeded in a lopsided manner.44 Thus, the Court recognized
that a consideration of the impact of the decision, if the case were to
succeed, may lend support to a finding that it is of public importance. A
trial judge may consider this factor without necessarily prejudging the
merits of the case. Yet, in cases like Caron where there has been
long-standing uncertainty about the constitutional validity of a law, it
remains this latter factor which should be emphasized — the crucial
question is whether the uncertainty about the law transcends the applicant’s particular situation and risks injury to the broader public interest.45
The utility of Caron may be somewhat muted by the fact that the
award for interim costs was not required or made until after 18 months of
litigation. This will no doubt be how Crown counsel will attempt to
explain and distinguish it in future cases. The order was required to
prevent loss of “substantial costs incurred already, and months of court
time” and to keep the provincial court proceedings “on the rails”. This
context was unusual and weighed heavily in the Court’s analysis.46
We would argue that the deference that the Supreme Court exercised
in Caron is now more indicative of that Court’s attitude toward interim
costs than might be said of its attitude in Little Sisters #2. These awards
remain “exceptional” and available only in cases that are “sufficiently
special”; however, nowhere in Caron does the Court express the view
that interim costs are only available as a “last resort”. In rejecting the
43

Caron, supra, note 9, at para. 44.
Id., at para. 45.
This point has very recently been emphasized by the British Columbia Supreme Court in
making an award of advance costs in Dish Network L.L.C. v. Rex, [2011] B.C.J. No. 1557, 2011
BCSC 1105, at paras. 68, 256-258 (B.C.S.C.). That case is currently under appeal.
46
Caron, supra, note 9, at paras. 4-5, 21-22, 46.
44
45

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) COST STRATEGIES FOR LITIGANTS: R. v. CARON

443

application in Little Sisters #2, the Court compared the applicants, Little
Sisters Book and Art Emporium, to those in Okanagan and noted that the
former had not been “thrust” into the litigation and instead had taken the
large-scale litigation upon themselves. Nowhere in Caron is a similar
comparison made to ill effect, notwithstanding the Court notes that
Mr. Caron himself did not want a stay of proceedings. It also seems to be
the case that the Court’s deference to the decisions of the trial and appeal
courts (a deference that was not displayed to the trial court in Little
Sisters #2, or in Okanagan for that matter47), means that it may be some
time before another advance costs case makes its way to the highest
court. As noted above, it also means that counsel who want to win an
award of advance costs had better try to secure that win in the trial court.
(b) Impecuniosity
(i) Other Means of Bringing the Issues to Court
In practice, the Attorney General has often relied on the existence of
other potential plaintiffs (of means) in defence of an interim costs
application.
In Caron, the Court appears to have returned to the test articulated in
Okanagan and affirmed by the Chief Justice and Binnie J. in dissent in
Little Sisters #2, which is that the “party seeking the order must be
impecunious to the extent that, without such an order, that party would
be deprived of the opportunity to proceed with the case.”48 In other
words, the fact that other plaintiffs are subject to prosecution under the
same provisions is not determinative of the question whether other
realistic options exist for bringing the issues to trial.
Recall that the issue of French-language rights in Alberta had already
come before the courts on a number of occasions; however, the previous
cases were distinguishable and not considered binding for a variety of
reasons. Furthermore, civil and criminal prosecutions involving court
documents occur regularly in Alberta and the issue of an individual’s
47
To the point is Binnie J.’s comment in Little Sisters #2, supra, note 5, at para. 154, that
despite the recognition in Okanagan that “it is for the trial court to determine” whether advance costs
should be ordered, “[i]t is ironic that in both cases to reach this Court on the advance costs issue, the
trial court has been reversed.”
48
Okanagan, supra, note 4, at para. 36 (emphasis added); see also Little Sisters #2, supra,
note 5, at paras. 98, 142.
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right to use French in “proceedings before the courts” could have been
raised in any one of those proceedings. Nevertheless, this fact was no bar
to Mr. Caron’s claim for costs.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that no palpable error
had been made in reaching the conclusion that the matter could not
proceed without funding. The Court accepted the reasonableness of the
Alberta courts’ refusal “to allow the issue to go unresolved for want of a
champion with ‘deep pockets’ ”.49
Following Caron, a similar argument was made and rejected in
Daniels v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development).50 The defendants challenged whether in the context of an
interim costs order the fact that there were other cases proceeding which
could bring the issues to trial should negate the claim. The Court rejected
this argument on the particular facts of the case and also declined to
accede to this argument, noting that to answer the question of whether
other cases would provide the answer to the one raised in the case
“would be to speculate on the reasons and results which may be obtained
in other cases.”51
This return to the judgment in Okanagan is a positive step forward
for interim costs jurisprudence. In the wake of Caron this type of
argument — which can realistically be made in most non-Aboriginal
rights or title cases — is likely to have less traction.52
(ii) Fundraising Requirement
Caron reminds counsel of the importance of the applicant exhausting
all personal sources of funds and seeking funds from the community.
While the majority in Little Sisters #2 said that “[t]he impecuniosity
requirement … means that it must be proven to be impossible to proceed
…,”53 the judgment in Caron appears to reflect more closely that of Binnie
J. in Little Sisters #2.54 Specifically, in rejecting the Crown’s argument that
49

Caron, supra, note 9, at paras. 5, 9, 41.
[2011] F.C.J. No. 281, 2011 FC 230 (F.C.).
51
Id., at para. 20.
52
See, e.g., Dish Network L.L.C. v. Rex, [2011] B.C.J. No. 1557, 2011 BCSC 1105, at
para. 158 (B.C.S.C.), where the British Columbia Supreme Court rejected such an argument
by Canada.
53
Little Sisters #2, supra, note 5, at para. 71.
54
Id., at para. 141.
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Mr. Caron should have done more both personally and by way of a
fundraising campaign, the Supreme Court of Canada explained:
Mr. Caron took the necessary steps to ensure payment of his costs
for what his lawyers (unrealistically, it might be said) indicated could
be a two- to five-day affair. These steps included mobilizing his own
limited funds, seeking funding from the Alberta francophone
association (Association canadienne-française de l’Alberta) (although
the Association refused to fund his case, he obtained two loans of
$15,000 each from its supporters), and securing some additional
donations and $70,000 from the federal Court Challenges Program
(paid in increments as the trial lengthened from month to month). He
also solicited support over the Internet. Legal Aid was not available.
…..
As to Mr. Caron’s financial circumstances, the superior court judge
concluded that, while he was willing to expend (and had expended) his
own and borrowed money (as well as funding from the Court
Challenges Program) to the limit, Mr. Caron’s resources had been
exhausted by the time the applications for the orders in issue were
made. He could not finance the last leg of his protracted trial. The
Crown argues that Mr. Caron ought to have pursued a more aggressive
fundraising campaign, particularly within Alberta’s francophone
community. The Queen’s Bench judge, on the contrary, was impressed
with the “responsible manner” in which Mr. Caron had pulled together
finances for the anticipated length of trial and its unexpected
continuances. However, as the scope of the expert evidence continued
to expand, it was not “realistically possible” for him to launch a formal
fundraising campaign given the trial schedule and its demands (2007
ABQB 632, at para. 30). The Queen’s Bench judge declared himself
“satisfied that Mr. Caron has no realistic means of paying the fees
resulting from this litigation, and that all other possibilities for funding
have been canvassed, but in vain” (para. 31). The Crown’s objection on
this point was not accepted in the courts below and those courts made
no palpable error in reaching the conclusion they did.55

We argued that the question must be whether a superior court judge
is satisfied that an ordinary citizen does not have the reasonable means of
meeting the expense of determining his or her constitutional rights and
other issues of broad public importance. We also argued that courts
should not require communities or individuals to assume crippling debt
55
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because to do so unduly taxes individuals and communities meant to
enjoy the protection of the Charter. The Court did not expressly adopt our
argument on these points, but the Court does now seem more alive to the
realities of litigation and the fact that trial scheduling may impact the
ability of a litigant to undertake a formal fundraising campaign. The
judgment in Caron suggests that this lack of time will not be held against
the litigant who is otherwise diligent in pursuing funding options.

V. QUANTUM OF COSTS
On the critical issue of quantum of costs, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision was brief:
Such funding orders, if made, “should be carefully fashioned and
reviewed over the course of the proceedings to ensure that concerns
about access to justice are balanced against the need to encourage the
reasonable and efficient conduct of litigation, which is also one of the
purposes of costs awards” (Okanagan, at para. 41). In the present case,
the judges were working within the confines of a trial in progress.
Nevertheless, the order of Ouellette J. in the Court of Queen’s Bench
did put a cap on allowable hours for the expert witnesses, and
disallowed a payment of $3,504.60 for a “temporary assistant”. It
seems that Judge Wenden in the provincial court was working with
invoices not in the record before us. In his October 18, 2006 order
(A.R., vol. 1, at pp. 2-13), Wenden Prov. Ct. J. clearly refused to make
an ex ante blank cheque. On August 2, 2006, he ordered the Crown to
pay Mr. Caron’s already incurred (and therefore quantified) legal fees.
All in all, I accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the
financial controls in place were adequate and met the Okanagan
standard.56

To be sure, the question of quantum of costs to be paid on an interim
costs order is a matter of discretion for the trial judge.
Substantial indemnity costs (“special costs” in B.C. and “solicitor
client costs” in most other jurisdictions) are only awarded after the
hearing of a matter in “exceptional cases”,57 which is to say they are “the
exception, not the norm.”58 It is our strong view that a litigant who has
56

Id., at para. 47.
Finney v. Barreau du Québec, [2004] S.C.J. No. 31, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17, 2004 SCC 36, at
para. 48 (S.C.C.).
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met the stringent test for advance costs, including showing that the case
is rare and exceptional should by definition always be granted substantial
indemnity or special costs. The only exception is if counsel or the court
is of the view that the litigation can proceed on the basis of party-party
costs, and that will likely only happen if there are other sources of partial
funding available or if the lawyer is prepared to do the case on a partial
contingency basis. If special costs are not ordered, the litigation will not
be able to go forward, or if it does, the court will not avoid a “lopsided”
trial with significant adverse effects on seeing justice done.
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that there is some resistance to
this proposition in the jurisprudence. For instance in Little Sisters #2,
McLachlin C.J.C., in concurring reasons, held:
I wish to add a note on the scale of costs. The chambers judge said
nothing about the scale of costs. My colleagues appear to endorse a
capped limit on spending, having regard to the projected costs of the
litigation and litigation strategy. It is not clear to me that interim costs,
where justified, should be awarded on the basis of indemnification or
partial indemnification. In the seminal case of Jones v. Coxeter, the
court spoke of directing the defendant “to pay something to the plaintiff
in the mean time” (p. 642). In Okanagan, the costs were explicitly
stated to be “‘costs’ in the way it is usually used in the Supreme Court
Rules [B.C. Reg. 221/90] and in litigation parlance — i.e., taxable costs
described in R. 57 [party and party costs]”: see para. 10 of Newbury
J.A.’s reasons in Okanagan ((2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 273, 2001 BCCA
647), which were approved by this Court, at para. 47, when it dismissed
the appeal. It seems reasonable that an advance costs award cannot give
the applicant more than it would receive were it successful at trial.59

The difficulty we have with this passage is that an award of advance
costs will only be made when without it the case will not proceed. And it
will be a rare case where the case will proceed if all that is awarded is
party-party costs. Hence, it is respectfully submitted that it is simply not
reasonable to limit an applicant for advance costs to the same amount of
costs that a litigant who was not impecunious and was able to proceed
with the litigation was entitled to at the conclusion of the trial. Justice
Binnie was more generous in Little Sisters #2 accepting that the award

59
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should be capped at the applicant’s estimate of costs and otherwise
endorsing the agreement worked out between the parties.60
To the extent the Court has commented on this where the issue was
actually part of their order, they have upheld (in Okanagan) an order that
might have led to substantial indemnity costs61 and have upheld (in
Caron) an order that amounted to substantial indemnity costs.62

VI. CONCLUSION
At the heart of an order for interim costs in litigation of public importance is a concern about access to justice. Chief Justice Finch of the
B.C. Court of Appeal recently emphasized the constitutional, practical
and moral import of this principle in an address to the Canadian Bar
Association:
[A]ccess to justice is a constitutionally recognized principle in Canada.
It is a necessary element for maintaining the legitimacy of our judicial
system. It is also morally wrong that some are able to enforce or defend
their civil rights while others, based solely on their inability to pay, are
denied access to justice.63

The jurisprudence on advance costs, including Caron, represents an
important development of ensuring that justice is not beyond the reach
of citizens of ordinary means who shoulder the burden of litigation of
public importance. Yet more needs to be done if the constitutional
principle of access to justice is to be a practical reality in our law and
society. The requirement of “exceptionality” is one that will no doubt
be with us for some time. However, one hopes that with time, trial
courts will be emboldened to find many more “exceptional” cases even
if the questions they raise may not put an end to the survival of a
community (Okanagan) or call into question the validity of the entire
corpus of a jurisdiction’s statutes (Caron). While not every Charter case
60

Id., at paras. 159-160.
In Okanagan, supra, note 4, at paras. 17, 47, the Supreme Court of Canada sustained the
order made by Newbury J.A. in the B.C. Court of Appeal that explicitly left open the possibility that
the Chambers Judge could award special costs as interim costs.
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In Caron, supra, note 9, at para. 4, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld two awards of
interim costs that amounted to full funding of the last leg of Mr. Caron’s case.
63
Address of Chief Justice Finch to the Canadian Bar Association – B.C. Branch,
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is of transcendent importance, many of those that we have to turn away
for want of funding had the potential to advance some very important
values in Canadian society and, if successful, would make Canada a
better place for minorities and those for whom the Charter was enacted
in the first place.
It is difficult to take too seriously the notion that advance costs orders need to be unduly constrained on fiscal grounds given that the
(usually) government defendant that is alleged to have violated the
citizens’ rights or freedoms exercises little or no such fiscal restraint
when defending itself.64 Government lawyers, whether in public or
private practice, get paid from the same tax dollars that would fund
advance costs awards paid to lawyers retained by citizens to protect
their fundamental rights and freedoms. Notwithstanding that the
government is presumed to act in the public interest, when a case of
public importance that is prima facie meritorious is before the courts,
there needs to be a way to ensure those tax dollars are spent more
equitably and fairly than the present law allows.

64
We are grateful for comments we received on an earlier draft of this paper wherein the
reviewer noted: “While government undoubtedly has greater fiscal resources than most private
litigants, the suggestion that it exercises ‘no such fiscal restraint’ is, at least in my experience in
Ontario, an unfair exaggeration. All Ministries operate within budgetary constraints and spending on
litigation must be justified and is subject to approval. Nobody that I know gets a blank cheque to
defend Charter challenges.” While we accept this statement as far as it goes, it fails to meet our
point, which is that if government is exercising fiscal restraint it is certainly not noticeable from the
perspective of plaintiff’s counsel. Indeed, we have asked the Court, on occasion, to simply order that
the plaintiff receive the same budget and rates as the government defendant’s counsel — a request
that is always vigorously opposed by those same lawyers. Having been a government lawyer, I know
just how spoiled and privileged I was, given the resources at my command in comparison to those
available to lawyers on the other side acting for poor or even middle-class individuals.

